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#2A-10/13/37 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ELMIRA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 2638. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8937 
ELMIRA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PAUL S. MAYO, Field Representative, for Charging Party 
SAYLES. EVANS, BRAYTON, PALMER & TIFFT. ESQS. (EDWARD 
HOFFMAN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
NORMAN H. GROSS. ESQ. (HENRY F. SOBOTA. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for the NYS School Boards Association, 
Amicus Curiae 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Elmira 
City School District (District) from an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALJ) decision which found that the District had 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by refusing to negotiate a demand made 
by the Elmira Teachers Association. Local 2638. NYSUT, AFT. 
AFL-CIO (Association) that the District apply for 
Excellence-in-Teaching (EIT) funds, consisting of State 
monies made available to school districts solely for the 
purpose of improving teacher salaries. The ALJ found that 
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Board - U-8937 -2 
) 
nothing in the legislation creating the opportunity to apply 
for such monies indicated a legislative intent to prohibit 
bargaining concerning the application for EIT monies, and 
further found that, by virtue of the unique nature and 
purpose of the funds, which are intended solely to 
supplement teacher salaries, and not to create new programs 
which would otherwise be within the prerogative of 
management to establish, a decision to apply for EIT funds 
to the State of New York by the District constitutes a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. The District excepts to 
the ALJ decision upon the grounds that the language of the 
legislation must be read to infer that the New York State 
) Legislature did not intend the decision to apply for EIT 
funds to be a subject of bargaining, and that the right to 
apply for this State aid is a managerial prerogative which 
outweighs the Taylor Law right to bargain. 
FACTS 
In April 1986. the New York State Legislature amended 
§3602 of the Education Law by adding a new subdivision 27, 
which entitles school districts, upon application, to a 
portion of State EIT aid, which is to be used solely to 
improve teacher salaries.— The legislation directs the 
Commissioner of Education to promulgate regulations 
1/L. 1986. Chapter 53; Education Law. §3602 (27)(a). 
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necessary to implement the program. Pursuant to the 
regulations so promulgated, applications by school districts 
2/ 
for EIT funds must be filed by October 1 of each year.— 
On September 9. 1986, the District determined not to 
make application for the EIT funds, and immediately 
thereafter, on September 10. the Association demanded that 
the District negotiate its decision whether or not to apply 
for the funds. On September 17, 1986. the District informed 
the Association that it refused to negotiate its decision, 
and the instant improper practice charge ensued. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 3602(27)(a) of the Education Law provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
[U]pon application a school district shall be 
eligible for an Excellence-in-Teaching 
apportionment to improve teacher salaries . . . . 
All funds made available to a school district 
pursuant to this subdivision shall be distributed 
among teachers in accordance with this subdivision 
and shall be in addition to salaries heretofore or 
hereafter negotiated or made available. In school 
districts where the teachers are represented by 
certified or recognized employee organizations, 
all salary increases funded pursuant to this 
subdivision shall be determined by separate 
collective negotiations conducted pursuant to the 
provisions and procedures of article fourteen of 
the civil service law, notwithstanding the 
existence of a negotiated agreement between a 
school district and a certified or recognized 
employee organization. 
2/Title 8, NYCRR. §175.35. 112a 
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In its exceptions, the District contends that the 
language of the legislation at issue requires a finding that 
the New York State Legislature did not intend to permit 
bargaining on the decision whether to apply for EIT funding, 
since the legislation is silent on that issue, while, at the 
same time, makes reference to negotiations with respect to 
the disbursement of funds actually received. It contends 
that the principle of legislative construction, expressio 
3/ 
unius est exclusio alterius, should apply.-
While this principle is an appropriate one for our 
consideration, we find that its application to the 
legislation at issue does not warrant the finding argued by 
the District. If the Legislature had been silent on the 
question of the negotiability of the application for EIT 
funds, while, at the same time, directing nothing more than 
that negotiations take place with respect to the 
distribution of funds received, the argument of the District 
would be more persuasive. However, we read the legislation 
as placing the focus not on a duty to negotiate (or an 
absence thereof), but on a duty to conduct negotiations 
1/McKinney's Consolidated Laws of NY. Book 1, 
Statutes, §240 describes the principle of legislative 
construction as follows: "the maxim expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius is applied in the construction of the 
statutes, so that where a law expressly describes a 
particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an 
irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or 
not included was intended to be omitted or excluded." 
11229 
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separately from the usual collective bargaining process. In 
other words, the focus of the legislative reference to 
negotiation is only on its separateness from other 
negotiations and not on whether there is any duty at all to 
negotiate over application for EIT money. The legislative 
intent that negotiation concerning distribution of EIT 
monies be conducted separately from and in addition to the 
usual collective bargaining negotiations does not give rise 
to an inference that the authority of a school district to 
apply for these funds at the outset cannot, or should not, 
be bargained. 
A second issue raised by the District is that the 
application for funding pursuant to §3602 of the Education 
Law must remain a matter of management prerogative because 
to find otherwise would place the school district in the 
position of having to bargain its mission, which, we have 
held and the courts of the State of New York have held, they 
cannot and should not be reguired to do. However, we find 
that the ALJ is correct in his conclusion that the EIT 
monies at issue here differ significantly from the other 
types of state aid made available pursuant to other 
subsections of §3602. Other subsections provide funding for 
£^.i_^sNj.i-Giii iD WAX j . v j . 1 G Q \^*.*.\^ \J j * ^ A . « . I _ I V » - A . . I . \ ^ I » juCi j \s j - i l l a jr J-J. v \* «• J- w **. w v 
implement, and relate to the types, levels, and scope of 
services and programs offered by the school districts. The 
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EIT funding, on the other hand, is solely available to 
increase the pay provided to teachers who are already 
performing the services which the district has elected to 
offer to the community. Thus, despite the fact that the 
authorization for EIT funding appears in the same section of 
the Education Law as funding authorizations for programs and 
services, we agree with the ALJ in his finding that EIT 
funding is substantially different from the other types of 
funding, such that the question of the negotiability of the 
decision to apply for EIT funding is appropriately treated 
differently. 
Having found that the language of the legislation 
contains no prohibition against bargaining the decision to 
apply for EIT funding, and having found that the application 
decision so directly affects terms and conditions of 
employment of teachers, in that its sole purpose is to 
increase teacher salaries (a subject which would, without 
question, normally constitute a mandatory subject of 
bargaining), it remains to be determined whether, as a 
matter of public policy, it should be concluded, as argued 
by the District, that a balancing of the rights and 
interests of the respective parties warrants a finding that 
the decision to apr*lv' for EIT funds constitutes a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining. 
The District argues that our decision in Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of 
11231 
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New York. 19 PERB 1P015 (1986), requires a finding that the 
balancing of the employer's interest in managing its own 
affairs outweighs the employees' interest in negotiating 
their terms and conditions of employment. In that case, we 
considered the question of whether implementation of 
§2590-g(13 and 14) of the Education Law. which required 
certain financial disclosure concerning business 
relationships between school districts and district 
personnel, constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
We held that, to the extent that §2590-g(13) of the 
Education Law requires school districts to obtain certain 
financial disclosures, but §2590-g(14) accords it discretion 
to obtain other financial information, the former is a 
prohibited subject of bargaining and the latter is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. We there stated: "Once 
subdivision 14[of Section 2590-g Education Law] gave the 
District the discretion to take certain actions, those 
actions became part of its Taylor Law duty to negotiate in 
good faith." 19 PERB ir3015, at 3035. 
In our view, contrary to the contention of the 
District, our holding in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York supports the 
f i n n p l n e i n n r o a p h p d h v •hVip AT..T '•"hat" T.7Vipr-ia l p n i e l a t i n n flnoc 
not specifically require an employer to act, but merely 
gives it the discretion to do so. the exercise of that 
11232 
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discretion will, if it affects terms and conditions of 
employment, fall within the Taylor Law duty to negotiate. 
The decision of the ALJ is affirmed in this regard also. 
In summary, we find that the decision to apply for EIT 
funding so directly and materially affects terms and 
conditions of teachers' employment as to constitute a 
mandatory subject of bargaining, absent the expression of a 
legislative intent to exclude the subject from bargaining; 
we further find that there is no expression of explicit and 
clear legislative intent to remove the decision to apply 
from the duty to collectively negotiate; and we further find 
that, because the application for EIT funds does not relate 
primarily to the employer's mission, there is no articulated 
public policy in favor of declaring such application to 
constitute a management prerogative which is outside the 
scope of negotiations. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge is hereby affirmed and it is 
ORDERED that the Elmira City School District: 
(1) Forthwith negotiate in good faith with the Elmira 
Teachers Association, Local 2638. NYSUT. AFT, 
AFL-CIO, a decision to apply for the state aid 
apportionment provided by Education Law §3602(27) 
for the 1986-87 school year, and, upon demand, for 
subsequent school years for which such funding is 
^available; 
11233 
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(2) Sign and post the attached notice at 
all work locations ordinarily used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: October 13. 1987 
Aib a-n-y-,-—N ew Yo r-k 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe r 
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APPENDIX 
OTICE10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to affaetuata tha policies ol tha 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
wa haraby notify a H employees represented by the Elmira Teachers Association, 
Local 2638, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO that the Elmira City School District: 
1. Will forthwith negotiate in good faith with the Elmira 
Teachers Association, Local 2638, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
a decision to apply for the state aid apportionment pro-
vided by Education Law §3602(27) for the 1986-87 school 
year, and, upon demand, for subsequent school years for 
which such funding is available. 
Elmira City School District 
Dated By (R*pr«Mntativt) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must nof be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ii^S^ 
#2B- 1 0/13/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANONYMOUS. 
Charging Party, 
-aJid-=- _: ;._ .-_ -^CASE-NO-.—U---9-40-4 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION. LOCAL 100. 
Respondents. 
APFELBAUM & LAFAZAN. ESQS. (BARRY APFELBAUM. ESQ. of 
Counsel), for Anonymous Charging Party 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, General Counsel (RICHARD DREYFUS. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for New York City Transit 
Authority 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
attorney for a theretofore unnamed- charging party (or 
parties) to the dismissal, by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director), of a 
charge filed against the New York City Transit Authority 
i/ln his exceptions, counsel for the theretofore 
unknown charging party provides, for the first time, the 
names of two persons on whose behalf he appears. Their 
status as charging parties and the timing of their 
identification are addressed infra. However, for the 
purpose of this appeal, the case is described as it was 
presented to the Director. 
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(TA). alleging a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), and against the 
Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU), alleging a 
violation of §203 of the Act. 
The attorney's original charge asserted the following: 
I am in possession of a list containing the 
names and identification numbers of 
approximately [blank in original] 
employees who are members of the TWU, Local 
100, who have been informed of the nature 
of the allegations of this petition and 
have concurred therein. As a precaution 
against possible repercussions against 
these individuals, their identities have 
not been revealed but will be if and when 
required. 
Upon receipt of the charge, the Director, by his designee, 
advised the attorney that the charge was deficient in a 
number of respects. The "deficiency letter" indicated first 
that only an authorized negotiating agent has standing to 
file a charge alleging a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
against a public employer, and that the individual 
representative filing the charge accordingly had no standing 
to so file. 
A second deficiency set forth in the letter was that an 
improper practice charge may not allege a violation of §203 
of the Act. but must assert violations of §209-a.2(a) or (b) 
of the Act, if making a claim before PERE of an improper 
practice by an employee organization. 
11237 
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The letter also addressed the allegations made in the 
charge against TWU, noting that the charge "sets forth no 
specifics, such as times and places of events and names of 
persons involved, as required by PERB's Rules. Rather, it 
speaks in generalities and conclusory terms." 
In response to the "deficiency letter", the attorney 
provided details concerning the manner in which the TA failed 
to continue terms of the expired agreement between the TA and 
the TWU. but made no allegation that the "(e)" case was 
brought by or on behalf of the negotiating agent, the TWU. 
Based upon the failure of the representative of the 
unnamed charging parties to assert an appearance on behalf of 
) the negotiating agent, the Director dismissed so much of the 
charge as alleged a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
against the TA. 
The charging party made no response to the deficiency 
letter insofar as it stated that an allegation of §203 of the 
Act is not cognizable as an improper practice charge before 
PERB. 
No additional details were provided in response to the 
deficiency letter's statement that, to the extent the charge 
alleged a violation of the duty of fair representation, it 
lacked the specificity required by PERB's Rules of 
Procedure. The charge failed to set forth times and places 
of events and names of persons involved. The original charge 
11238 
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alleged that the TWU has "failed and refused to take action 
on behalf of the membership when faced with a growing number 
of complaints regarding such unilateral changes in terms and 
conditions of employments.[sic]" A reading of the charge in 
its entirety indicates that the changes in terms and 
conditions of employment referenced by charging party relate 
to alleged changes in the TA's sick leave policy and 
seniority rights, and the processing of grievances in 
relation thereto. 
Instead of providing details concerning these matters, 
charging party made a submission alleging that a breach of 
the duty of fair representation occurred by virtue of a 
"failure to ensure a safe workplace". However, the 
information contained in the submission merely alleges that 
the TA has failed to provide a safe workplace, without any 
other details or even allegation that the TWU failed or 
refused in an arbitrary, grossly negligent or irresponsible 
fashion, to remedy problems brought to its attention. 
Indeed, no allegation is made by charging party that the TWU 
had knowledge of the alleged unsafe working conditions. 
In his decision, the Director dismissed the charge upon 
the ground that it did not identify a charging party by name, 
address, and affiliation, if any. as required by §204.1(b)(1) 
of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). The attorney excepts 
11239 
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to this decision upon the ground that he was never notified 
that the charge was deficient in this respect, while he was 
2/ 
advised of other deficiencies.— 
We conclude that the charge was properly dismissed 
against the TA upon the ground that only a negotiating agent 
has standing to file a charge alleging a violation of 
3/ §209-a.l(e) of the Act.— . Although the representative of 
the charging party provided the names of two individuals as 
part of his exceptions to the Director's decision, he does 
not assert that either of these individuals has the authority 
to file an improper practice charge on behalf of the TWU. 
which is the duly authorized negotiating agent for the 
at-issue employees. Therefore, we affirm the Director's 
decision insofar as it dismisses the charge against the TA. 
With respect to the charge against the TWU, having fully 
reviewed the original charge, the response to the Director's 
deficiency letter, and the exceptions to the Director's 
decision, it is our conclusion that, even if the attorney had 
timely supplied a sufficient identification of the 
^In view of our holding in this case, it is not 
necessary for us to decide whether the Director's 
deficiency letter adequately apprised the charging party of 
this defect. Such notice is not. in any event, required by 
our Rules and practice before a defective charge can be 
dismissed. 
I/CUNY and PSC/CUNY (Soffer). 20 PERB 1[3051 (1987). 
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charging party, as required by §204.1(b)(1) of our Rules, the 
charge remains deficient and should be dismissed. In the 
first instance, charging party has failed to amend its charge 
to allege a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. and 
continues to allege a violation of §203 of the Act, which, as 
the Director held, is not cognizable as a basis for an 
improper practice charge. Secondly, even if a violation of 
§209-a.2(a) had been alleged, the charge would still be 
deficient, since it fails to set forth "a clear and concise 
statement of the facts constituting the alleged improper 
practice, including the names of the individuals involved in 
the alleged improper practice, the time and place of 
occurrence of each particular act alleged, and the 
subsections of §209-a of the Act alleged to have been 
violated" [Rules, §204.1(b)(3)]. Furthermore, the 
submission provided in response to the notice of deficiency 
provides no additional details concerning the allegations 
contained in the original charge, but, instead, makes new and 
different allegations, which themselves fail to meet the 
specificity requirements of our Rules. 
Finally, with or without additional details, neither the 
charge nor the additional submission sets forth a claim 
which, if proven, would constitute a violation of §209-a.2(a) 
of the Act. since there is no claim that the TWU refused or 
failed, after being requested, to file, investigate, or 
11241 
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process grievances in a manner which was improperly 
motivated, grossly negligent or irresponsible. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is our conclusion that the 
charging party representative's offer to name two 
individuals, in place of "Anonymous", as charging parties 
does not cure the deficiency of the charge with respect to 
the TA. since the individuals named have no standing to file 
a charge pursuant to §209-a.l(e) of the Act. and the 
remaining deficiencies of the charge with respect to the TWU 
would also not be cured by the naming of individual charging 
parties, because the charge substantively fails to allege a 
violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
IT IS. THEREFORE. ORDERED that the charge be. and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 13, 1987 
Albany. New York 
11242 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SAVONA FACULTY ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9166 
SAVONA CENTRAL SCHOOLEDISTRICT7 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL. Field Representative, for Charging 
Party 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Savona 
Faculty Association (Association) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which dismissed its charge 
against the Savona Central School District (District). The 
charge alleges that the District violated §§209-a.1(a). (c). (d) 
and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
reducing the duty-free time of a unit employee, Elizabeth 
Herrick. as a result of the filing of a grievance by the 
Association on her behalf. The grievance asserted that the size 
of Herrick's classes exceeded the maximum agreed upon between 
the parties in their collective bargaining agreement. In 
response to the grievance, the District split the classes and 
increased the number of classes to be taught by Herrick, thus 
reducing her unassigned time. 
The ALJ dismissed so much of the charge as alleged a 
11243 
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violation of §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act upon the ground 
that the reduction in Herrick's unassigned time and commensurate 
increase in her assigned duty time (in the form of one and 
one-half hours of additional class time during the workday per 
week) was implemented to remedy the class size grievance filed 
by the Association. Having found that the action taken 
constituted a remedy for, or minimization of the impact of, the 
matter which was the subject of Herrick's grievance, rather than 
a reprisal for filing the grievance, the ALJ concluded that 
§§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act had not been violated. 
We find that the ALJ correctly applied the principles set 
forth in County of Nassau v. PERB. 103 A.D.2d 274. 17 PERB 1R016 
(2d Dep't 1984), County of Nassau. 16 PERB ir4631 (1983). and 
other cases decided by this Board, and he acted within his 
discretion in making the findings of fact necessary to reach the 
conclusion that no improper motivation prompted the complained 
of action. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ in 
this regard. 
With respect to the Association's claims of violation of 
§§209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Act, it asserts that Herrick's 
unassigned time is in fact free time and that the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement does not cover the issue of free 
) i^The agreement does contain language concerning the 
provision of minimum amounts of "preparation" time. However, the 
ALJ concluded that preparation time is different from unassigned 
time, and that the collective bargaining agreement does not cover 
the issue. We concur. . -l-f 
Board - U-9166 
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The ALJ concluded, based upon the record before him. that 
the primary purpose of unassigned time is to perform work-
related responsibilities which cannot be performed during 
assigned classroom periods, and that both unassigned and 
assigned time therefore together constitute "worktime". The 
ALJ further held that the use of worktime constitutes a 
management prerogative, subject only to the limitation that the 
duties assigned by the District constitute an inherent part of 
the employee's usual job functions, citing Norwich CSD. 14 PERB 
1[3059 (1981). and that the issue of unassigned worktime was not 
covered by the contract. The ALJ accordingly dismissed the 
charge insofar as it alleges a violation of §209-a.l(d) and (e) 
of the Act. 
We agree with the ALJ's finding that, under the facts of 
this case, unassigned time constitutes worktime. in that 
Herrick was expected to be available at the library for student 
visits, and to perform "library work, shelving books, ordering 
things, taking care of videos, taking care of AV equipment" 
(testimony of the District Superintendent). Herrick confirms 
in her testimony that during unassigned time she would work 
primarily on job-related duties, although she would sometimes 
conduct personal business. 
It is our determination that the findings of fact made by 
the ALJ are fully supported by the record, and that changes in 
the assignment of duties during working time do not give rise 
to a violation of §§209-a.l(d) or (e) of the Act, since such 
11245 
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changes are a prerogative of management not otherwise covered 
2/ by the parties' agreement.— Even if this were not so, the 
record does not support the Association's claim that a change 
in past practice occurred when the change in the balance of 
unassigned and assigned time was made in Herrick's schedule, 
since it was not established that any consistent practice 
existed with respect to the amount or proportion of unassigned 
time allotted to teachers within the District. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is 
affirmed and WE THEREFORE ORDER THAT the charge be, and it 
hereby is. dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 13, 1987 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
i^See Norwich CSD, supra, and cases cited therein. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
— ~an& CASE-NO.—U—9-3-79 — 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, p_r_o se 
BERNARD F. ASHE. ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry (charging party) from the dismissal of his charge that 
the United University Professions (respondent) violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). The charge arose out of a letter sent by the 
president-elect of a chapter of the respondent to the 
charging party and other nonmember agency fee payers. The 
letter offers reasons why nonmembers should join the union, 
including a statement that "you are paying 1% agency fee dues 
(like members)...." Charging party asserts that this 
statement is untrue, and that the issuance of an untrue 
statement which attempts to induce agency fee payers to join 
Board - U-9379 -2 
a union violates §209-a.2(a) of the Act.-
Section 208.3(a) of the Act, in fact, authorizes the 
deduction from nonmembers' wages of an agency fee in an amount 
"equivalent to the dues levied by such employee 
organization...." Since the membership dues of respondent 
equal 1% of salary, it is in fact true that respondent has the 
right to deduct an equal amount from the salaries of agency fee 
payers, as indicated in the letter complained of by charging 
party. The inaccuracy in the letter is one of omission, in 
that it fails to point out that agency fee payers who object to 
the use of their fees for "activities or causes of a political 
or ideological nature only incidentally related to terms and 
conditions of employment" (§208.3(a) of the Act) are entitled 
to the return of their pro rata share of such expenditures upon 
demand. Accordingly, some agency fee payers (those who file 
objections), in fact, pay less than members, while those who do 
not object pay the same fee as members. The statement 
contained in the at-issue letter is therefore true for some 
agency fee payers, but not for others. 
i^Section 209-a.2(a) makes it an improper practice for 
an employee organization to "deliberately (a) ... interfere 
with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of 
the rights granted in" Section 202. Section 202 affords to 
public employees the right to "form, join and participate in. 
or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, any 
i employee organization of their own choosing." 
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The ALJ dismissed the charge upon the ground that the 
statement must not only be shown to be untrue, but must also 
have the effect of misleading a reasonable agency fee payer so 
as to interfere with the free exercise of his or her right to 
join or refrain from joining the employee organization. The 
ALJ found that it did not so mislead. 
We find that the determination of the ALJ was correct. 
The mere act of issuing a statement which is not wholly 
accurate (or which is accurate only as to agency fee payers who 
do not file objections to the expenditure of their fees for 
political and ideological purposes only incidentally related to 
terms and conditions of employment), does not give rise to a 
2/ 
violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act.- where, because of the 
statutory proviso and previous litigation affecting the 
respondent's agency fee procedure, a reasonable member of the 
class could not have been misled. 
2/See. Auburn Administrators Association. 11 PERB 
ir3086 (1978), in which we held that a false statement made 
to a nonmember which misled him into believing that he 
"would have to join [the union] if he wanted to be fairly 
represented" (at 3142) constituted a violation of 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act. See also United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2. 15 PERB 1f3103 (1982); United University 
Professions, 17 PERB 1[3061 (1984). 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ be 
affirmed, and the charge is accordingly dismissed in its 
entirety. 
DATED: October 13, 1987 
Albany-.--New—York-
^S^/^- /Ut^~-^^/-m^.. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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#3A-10/13/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WARSAW SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, NEA. 
Petitioner. 
-and-__: CASE NO. C-3203 
WARSAW CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the,Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Warsaw Support Staff 
Association. NEA/NY. NEA, has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regular full and part-time clerical 
staff including clerks, typists and 
secretaries; all regular full and 
part-time cafeteria staff, including 
cooks and food service helpers; all 
regular full and part-time maintenance 
staff, including cleaners and 
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custodians; all regular full and 
part-time bus drivers; all regular full 
and part-time teacher aides; all 
regular full and part-time teacher 
assistants; all regular full and 
part-time school nurses. 
Excluded: All administrative staff; secretary to 
the superintendent; all certificated 
tecichexs—in-J:li.e„districij_Dir.ector^ of 
Transportation; Superintendent of 
Buildings and Grounds; Principals, 
Elementary and High School; Assistant 
Principal; Superintendent; Food Service 
Manager; District Clerk/Business 
Manager; Secretary to the High School 
Principal; Secretary to the Elementary 
School Principal. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Warsaw Support Staff 
Association, NEA/NY. NEA. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: October 13, 1987 
Albany. New York 
/ H a r o l d R. Newman., Chairman 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Meitibe. 
#3b-10/13/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.. 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3252 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM. 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
) CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
.J for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time (including temporary 
full-time) and part-time (including 
temporary part-time and per diem) 
employees licensed or otherwise 
lawfully entitled to practice as a 
registered professional nurse who 
perform registered professional nursing 
iji nursing se_r^ ice_,_nursAng^ e_duc_ati_on 
or nursing administration. 
Excluded: Director of public health nursing. 
psychiatric nurses, nurses employed at 
the County Jail, and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc., Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages. 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder. 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 13. 1987 
Albany. New York 
^^zz^i-* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
ucc~ ?~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb« 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCOTIA-GLENVILLE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
— --and-
 L _CASE NO. C-32 63 
SCOTIA-GLENVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Scotia-Glenville Teachers' 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All teacher assistants, full-time and 
part-time. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Scotia-Glenville Teachers' 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 13. 1987 
Albany. New York 
%fcx^-g^^<C. Aiu^Tu £.ACj~7 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
\ 
^ -£<c f Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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